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Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to a 
wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some of his 
core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start with a 
discussion of and objections against the safety account of knowledge—a 
view he has championed and further developed over the years. I continue 
with some questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistem-
ic virtue for our understanding of knowledge. Safety and virtue hang 
very closely together for Sosa. All this easily leads to some thoughts on 
epistemic scepticism and on Sosa’s stance on this.
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Ernest Sosa has made and continues to make major contributions to 
a wide variety of topics in epistemology. In this paper I discuss some 
of his core ideas about the nature of knowledge and scepticism. I start 
with a discussion of the safety account of knowledge—a view he has 
championed and further developed over the years. I continue with some 
questions concerning the role of the concept of an epistemic virtue for 
our understanding of knowledge. Safety and virtue hang very closely 
together for Sosa. All this easily leads to some thoughts on epistemic 
scepticism and on Sosa’s stance on this.
1. Safety
It is 0.05 am on January 1, 2001. Jack just ﬁ nished his ﬁ rst letter ever 
to his old friend Jill. Jack knows the time and date and comes to believe 
that it took him until the 21st Century to ﬁ nish his ﬁ rst letter to Jill. 
There seems no reason to doubt that Jack knows this. Does it matter 
that Jack is confused about when the 21st Century begins? He thinks it 
began on January 1, 2000. If that would speak against his knowledge 
claim, then at least for some time at the beginning of the 21st Century 
many people, perhaps the majority, did not know that they were in the 
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21st Century. This seems false. We want to grant all those people this 
kind of knowledge even if they’re confused about a particular year in 
the past.
However, the calendaric confusion matters with respect to some-
thing else. Jack’s belief that he ﬁ nished his ﬁ rst letter to Jill in the 21st 
Century could have been easily false. Not much would have had to be 
different for his belief to be false: He would just have had to ﬁ nish the 
letter 6 minutes earlier. He would still have believed that he ﬁ nished 
the letter in the 21st Century but that belief would have been false. 
Jack’s belief is thus not “safe”, as this is called these days. Knowledge, 
according to some and especially to Sosa, requires a safe true belief. S’s 
belief that p is safe just in case 
(S) S believes that p ⇒ p (with “⇒” for the subjunctive conditional; cf., e.g., 
Sosa 1999, Williamson 2000).
Safety theorists are, of course, realistic enough to restrict the subjunc-
tive conditional to close possible worlds, and not to include all possible 
worlds. We do not have to deal with further details of the account or 
with additional clauses here.
The example above suggests that safety is not necessary for knowl-
edge: Jack’s belief constitutes knowledge but is not safe. This is an 
interesting result, given that many epistemologists nowadays adhere 
to the view that knowledge requires safety.1 But couldn’t the safety 
theorist say something in reply?
They could point out that Jack’s belief is not safe but also deny that 
Jack’s belief constitutes knowledge. One reason could be that his true 
belief was based on a false assumption. However, if we add a no-false-
belief condition for knowledge (cf., e.g., Clark 1963), then we’re exclud-
ing many clear cases of knowledge. Someone who knows that they are 
living in the year 2888 by deducing it from the false belief that the 
millennium started on January 1, 2000 would thus come out as not 
knowing that they live in the 29th Century. This seems false. It will 
also not help much to try to argue that Jack’s justiﬁ ed true belief is 
gettierized. This would seem ad hoc and, at least, in need of support by 
further arguments.
A more promising route might be to accept that Jack has knowledge 
and to deny that Jack’s belief is unsafe and rather to afﬁ rm it is safe 
because a world in which he ﬁ nished the letter 6 minutes earlier is not 
close enough to actuality to matter. But why is it not close enough? Not 
simply because that would save the safety account. If there is a fact of 
the matter which determines whether a possible world is close to the 
actual world, then our alternative world would rather come out as very 
close. Or so it seems. If there is no such fact of the matter, then all the 
worse for the safety account. Calling a possible world “close” to the 
1 Baumann forthcoming discusses all this in detail. Cf. also Neta/ Rohrbaugh 
2004: 399–400, Roush 2005: 118–126, Comesaña 2005: 397, Goldberg 2015, sec. 1 
and Sosa 2003: 159.
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actual world would simply be arbitrary. Nobody has so far shown that 
there is a non-arbitrary closeness metric for possible worlds (cf. Lewis, 
a, b). Whether there is such a metric or not, in both cases the safety 
theorist cannot get what he wants.
Should one, perhaps, say that Jack’s belief is safe but just not safely 
safe (cf. Sainsbury 1997; Williamson 2000: 123–130)? Have I mistaken 
the lack of second-order safety for the lack of ﬁ rst-order safety? Rough-
ly speaking, a belief is safe but not safely safe just in case it could not 
have been easily been false, given conditions C, but conditions C could 
easily not have been met. The problem with this view is that there does 
not seem to be a way to determine such unique conditions C. Depending 
on which conditions we choose, we get different answers to the question 
whether a belief was safe. Jack’s belief was safe, given that he was in 
the year 2001 when he ﬁ nished the letter but it was not safely safe be-
cause he could have easily been in the year 2000. However, Jack’s belief 
would come out as unsafe, given that he wrote the letter at some point 
during the winter 2000/2001. Nothing seems to determine one right 
description or choice of condition C.
If we do not have a plausible closeness metric for possible worlds, 
then the safety account hangs in the air because judgments about close-
ness of possible worlds are arbitrary. But even if we have a non-arbi-
trary ordering of possible worlds according to closeness to the actual 
world, we do get results in cases like Jack’s which speak against the 
safety view. One should therefore conclude that safety is not necessary 
for knowledge.
Sosa has recently proposed to relativize safety to the “basis” of the 
belief (cf. 2004: 322, fn.3 and 2007: 25–28): “A belief that p is basis-
relative safe, then, if and only if it has a basis that it would (likely) have 
only if true” (2007: 26). However, it is hard to see how this could help 
the safety theorist in our counter-example above. Why should one say 
that the basis of Jack’s belief would be different had he ﬁ nished his let-
ter just a couple of minutes ago? Certainly, to say that the basis would 
be different because then his belief would be false would trivialize the 
safety account. As long as no account is given of the criteria for the 
identity of a basis in general and how this helps against our counter-
example (as well as against similar examples), the doubts about the 
safety account remain.
2. Closure
There are more problems for the safety account. One has to do with a 
violation of closure:
(C) If S knows that p and also knows that (p → q), then S knows that q.
More conditions would have to be added but this rough, basic form of 
a closure principle should be sufﬁ cient for our purposes here. Take the 
following version of Kripke’s red barn objection against Nozick’s sensi-
tivity account of knowledge (cf. also Goldman’s dachshund example in 
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1983: 84). Mary is in fake barn county; only red barns are exempt—they 
are never fake. Mary is aware that red barns are never fake but she is 
not aware that she is in fake barn county. She ﬁ nds herself in front of 
a red barn and comes to believe and know that there is a red barn in 
front of her. Her belief is safe. She can infer from it that there is a barn 
in front of her. However, since her belief that there is a barn in front 
of her is not safe (it could have easily been wrong in fake barn county), 
the safety theorist would have to deny that she knows there is a barn 
in front of her. This, however, is not plausible. Apart from that, (C) 
would thus be violated (cf. Kvanvig 2004: 209).2 Sosa (2004: 292–294) 
concedes that there is a problem and proposes to relativize safety to a 
basis (see above). Again, it is hard to see how this could help the safety 
theorist. What is the difference as to the basis? It cannot be the truth 
of Mary’s belief that there is a red barn nor that her belief constitutes 
knowledge—because that would trivialize the safety account. As long 
as no more promising version of the safety account is available we have 
good reason to remain sceptical.
3. Probabilistic Safety
Perhaps one should express the intuition behind the safety account not 
in modal but in probabilistic terms (cf. for a similar move for the sen-
sitivity account Roush 2005). Here is the rough idea: Knowledge that 
p requires a true belief that p which also meets the following condition 
(with “P (p/ Bp)” referring to the conditional probability of p, given the 
subject’s belief that p):
(S*) P (p/ Bp) > some suitable value m
or, alternatively,
(S**) P (not-p and Bp) = some low value m << P (p and Bp).
Kvart (2006) has proposed such an account for the case of perceptual 
and memorial knowledge. The basic, rough idea is that 
(K) P (p/ Bp) >> P (p) (cf. Kvart 2006: 7).
And the value of the left hand side has to be high (10). Kvart has much 
more to say about this but we can leave it at this basic level here.
Unfortunately, there seem to be insuperable problems with such an 
account, too. First, it does not work for beliefs in necessary truths. P 
(p/ Bp) is always maximal (= 1), in such cases and the belief that p has 
nothing to do with P (p): P (p/ Bp) = P (p). Hence, (S*) or (S**) do not 
seem to add anything relevant and interesting to the true belief condi-
tion for knowledge in cases of necessary truths. Kvart’s condition (K) 
2 Pritchard (2005: 167–168) objects that one has to consider a wider range of 
possible worlds here which would make Mary’s belief that there is a red barn unsafe. 
However, this move seems ad hoc. One should also add that if Kripke’s example is 
a problem for sensitivity accounts, then it is also one for safety accounts. It is often 
assumed that it is only a problem for sensitivity accounts.
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would be false in such cases—as he himself recognizes—because P (p/ 
Bp) = P (p).
But even if we restrict the above probabilistic conditions to empirical 
knowledge of contingent propositions (as Kvart explicitly does), prob-
lems remain. Couldn’t the probability that Bill is in the 21st Century, 
given that he believes it be high (=1 or close to 1) just because he spends 
all (or almost all) of his life in that century? If the identity of a human 
being (like Bill) is determined by the identity of the parents’ sperm and 
egg and if there was no way Bill’s parents could have saved the sperm 
and egg for a different century, then the probability that Bill could have 
lived in a different century equals or approximates 0. Again, it seems 
that neither (S*) nor (S**) can do any work additional to the true belief 
condition for knowledge: P (p/ Bp) = P (p). And again, Kvart’s condition 
(K) turns out to be false. It is not clear how one could further restrict 
(S*), (S**), (K) or any other principle of that kind in order to deliver the 
right results. Apart from all that, the probabilistic version of the safety 
account would have problems with the closure principle, too, as a proba-
bilistic version of the red barn objection shows (I spare the reader the 
repetition in this case; but see some ideas in Roush 2005: 41–47).
4. Virtues
Perhaps we should then move the focus away from modal or probabi-
listic safety to virtues? Is knowledge true belief which results from the 
exercise of an epistemic virtue, as Sosa has been arguing for quite some 
time? Sosa (2007: 42) proposes the following deﬁ nition of knowledge: 
Knowledge is justiﬁ ed true belief which is also apt (that is, the result 
of the exercise of an epistemic virtue). One could call this “the JTAB 
account of knowledge” (cf. also Sosa 1988: 174–184; 1991a: 138–145; 
1991b; 1991c; 1992: 85–89; 1994: 29–33; 1997: 419–420; 2007: ch. 2).3
A being has a virtue only if there is the possibility of falling short 
of the virtue or of the exercise of the virtue. This implies that no being 
which cannot but behave in a certain way can be virtuous (or not virtu-
ous) with respect to that kind of behaviour. A being which simply can-
not help but perceive their immediate environment realistically and 
correctly would not count as epistemically virtuous (nor as epistemi-
cally deﬁ cient or “vicious”). To the degree that human perception under 
normal conditions is very much like that we would not have percep-
tual knowledge. This, however, seems false. This objection is still a 
relatively “inexpensive” shot against the safety account. But there are 
more serious worries.
There are cases where it seems rather clear that the subject has 
knowledge even though no virtue was exercised. This would also make 
3 Credit for a performance has two dimensions: the ability and the effort. We may 
praise someone for their performance because of the great ability that was exercised 
even if little effort went into it but we may also praise someone for the remarkable 
effort in the use of more restricted abilities.
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the idea doubtful that the exercise of a virtue is necessary for knowl-
edge. Suppose Joe is thinking hard about some difﬁ cult mathematical 
problem. Suddenly he can “see” the solution. He didn’t exercise special 
mathematical abilities; rather, the solution “just came to him”, a bit 
like in Kekulé’s case when—according to some accounts—he suddenly 
“saw” the structure of the benzene molecule in a dream or dream-like 
state. Joe thus comes to know the conclusion—without the exercise of 
an epistemic virtue. Sure, very often there are epistemic virtues in the 
background in such cases, like in Kekulé’s case. But even then, the 
epistemic virtues were not exercised (though somehow causally effec-
tive). In Joe’s case we can even assume that the relevant epistemic 
abilities or virtues weren’t even present in the background. But there 
still seems to be knowledge (though probably failing the standards of 
professional mathematicians’ knowledge) even without (an exercise of) 
epistemic virtue. Basic perceptual knowledge might be another case. 
Furthermore, if Joe forgets everything again after ﬁ ve minutes and 
never ever manages to reconstruct the solution despite repeated se-
rious attempts, we would be even more inclined to deny that he had 
the epistemic virtue but we wouldn’t deny that he knew the solution 
even if only for a short while. Knowledge can be short-lived but the 
corresponding virtue would be a more stable disposition. There are no 
virtues on one occasion only.4
What about the sufﬁ ciency of apt justiﬁ ed true belief for knowledge? 
Here is a counter-example. Sue is an expert on Rembrandt. Nobody 
comes close to her ability of telling whether something is a true Rem-
brandt or rather an imitation produced by a member of his school. Re-
cently, two paintings have been discovered: one an original Rembrandt 
and the other one an astonishing copy by a pupil. All the other leading 
experts had been asked and failed to tell which is which. Sue however 
uses her very special abilities and, after some time, comes up with the 
correct answer. She has a justiﬁ ed, true and apt belief which quali-
ﬁ es as knowledge. What, however, if we add the following aspect to 
our example: Unbeknownst to her, some jokester at the museum has 
used the latest high tech tools to produce reproductions of the same 
Rembrandt painting and put them next to the real one and the copy by 
the pupil. Nobody, not even Sue, can distinguish between the original 
and its high tech reproduction (if unmarked as such). Suppose these 
reproductions are next to the two paintings Sue has been examining. 
Easily, she could have been, by accident, presented with a high tech 
reproduction. It seems that under such circumstances she doesn’t know 
that the painting in front of her is an authentic Rembrandt. But it also 
seems plausible to say that her belief is justiﬁ ed, true, and apt: Hasn’t 
she used her extraordinary epistemic virtues to arrive at a justiﬁ ed 
4 In all these cases, Joe was lucky in some respect and his knowledge was “lucky” 
knowledge in that respect. (The idea that some knowledge can be lucky in a certain 
sense might seem quite unorthodox; whether it is and in what way, should be 
investigated further—but not here).
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true belief? But then justiﬁ ed, true and apt belief is not sufﬁ cient for 
knowledge.
One might object that even though Sue has some remarkable 
epistemic abilities she does not have the “right” or “relevant” ones here: 
abilities which would enable her to tell a Rembrandt from a high tech 
reproduction. But what, one would want to ask back, counts as the 
“right” or “relevant” abilities here? Does the subject need those abili-
ties which lead her to the truth in a non-accidental way? If that is the 
answer, then it comes with a prize: It is not clear anymore whether 
reference to epistemic virtues does the work it was supposed to do in 
the ﬁ rst place, namely to explain the non-accidentality of a given true 
belief. The accidentality problem would remain even given the exercise 
of some virtue. More would have to be said here if one wanted to defend 
a virtue theory of knowledge.
Sosa (2007: 96, fn. 1) holds that in fake barn cases (structurally sim-
ilar to the Rembrandt case above) only reﬂ ective knowledge is missing 
but not animal knowledge (cf. for this distinction: Sosa 1988: 182–184; 
1991b: 240; 1994: 29–30; 1997: 422, 427; 2004: 290–292; 2007: ch. 2 
Sosa 2009a: ch. 7). Reﬂ ective knowledge that p is justiﬁ ed true and 
apt (second-order) belief that one’s true and justiﬁ ed ﬁ rst-order belief 
that p is apt.5 One can apply this kind of response easily to the counter-
example above. However, I don’t ﬁ nd this very plausible: It seems very 
plausible to say that Sue also lacks “animal” knowledge that it is a real 
Rembrandt, too.
Perhaps one might want to reply that the conditions for the exer-
cise of the epistemic virtue were not the right ones in Sue’s case. Sosa 
(2007: 33) introduces condition C:
For any correct belief that p, the correctness of that belief is attributable 
to a competence only if it derives from the exercise of that competence in 
appropriate conditions for its exercise, and that exercise in those conditions 
would not then too easily have issued a false belief.
Perhaps the circumstances were not appropriate in Sue’s case. But why 
should we say that? Is it because she could have easily been wrong? But 
then the notion of safety rather than the notion of an epistemic virtue 
is doing the crucial bit of the work here. And we would be back with the 
problems for the safety view mentioned above. We also should not say 
that circumstances for the exercise are only appropriate if the subject 
gains knowledge under those circumstances. Given that we are trying 
to understand the nature of knowledge, this move would, again, trivial-
ize the virtue account.
5 Sosa (2007: 32) also characterizes reﬂ ective knowledge that p as second-order 
animal knowledge: animal knowledge that one has animal knowledge that p. So, 
reﬂ ective knowledge that p is based on animal knowledge of the second order. This 
might seem a bit odd, if only because it is not clear whether second-order attitudes 
could be “animal” ones at all.
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5. Virtuous Scepticism
Do epistemic virtues help against scepticism? Here is an argument to the 
effect that one traditional form of scepticism only arises for the more vir-
tuous or reﬂ ective. Take the template of Cartesian sceptical arguments 
(with “o” for an ordinary proposition and “s” for a sceptical proposition):
(1) S doesn’t know that not-s
(2) If S doesn’t know that not-s, then S doesn’t know that o
(3) Hence, S doesn’t know that o.
(2) is based on the assumption that
(4) S knows that (o → not-s).
If S knows that o, then S also knows—given closure (C) and (4)—that 
not-s. In other words, given closure and (4), if follows that
(2) If S doesn’t know that not-s, then S doesn’t know that o
Let us take a closer look at (4) and take a popular example. George 
knows that if he has hands, then he is not merely (and thus falsely) 
dreaming that he has hands. Now, knowledge requires understanding 
the known proposition. Whoever does not know that merely dreaming 
that p involves the false belief that p does not understand what merely 
dreaming is and thus does not understand that if they have hands, 
then they are not merely dreaming that they have hands. Therefore, 
they do not qualify as knowing (or even believing) that proposition. 
Hence, if it is true that
(5) George knows that if he has hands then he is not merely dream-
ing he has hands
then it is also true that 
(6) George knows that if he has hands then he does not falsely be-
lieve he has hands when he really has no hands.
This is an interesting result. It shows that the Cartesian sceptical ar-
gument only works under the assumption that the subject has second-
order concepts and second-order beliefs and can form beliefs about 
their own beliefs. In other words, at least the traditional Cartesian 
scepticism presupposes reﬂ ectivity. A being which is restricted to ﬁ rst-
order beliefs—to animal beliefs—is, ironically, not threatened by this 
kind of Cartesian scepticism. A lack of ability can save one from (some 
forms of) scepticism. Reﬂ ectivity, however, can "destroy" knowledge. 
Less would be more and more less.
Sosa (2007: ch. 2) argues that dream scepticism only threatens 
the possibility of reﬂ ective knowledge but not the possibility of ani-
mal knowledge. There is a weaker and a stronger interpretation of this 
claim. The stronger claim says that only those who do not reﬂ ect upon 
their epistemic states can retain their animal knowledge. The weak-
er claim says that in addition those subjects who do reﬂ ect on their 
epistemic state can retain their animal knowledge, too, and only “lose” 
their reﬂ ective knowledge. There is something to be said in favour of 
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the stronger claim: If one’s claims to reﬂ ective knowledge are threat-
ened by dream scepticism, then this seems to give the subject a good 
reason to become sceptical with respect to her ﬁ rst-order belief, too. 
Animal knowledge would collapse together with reﬂ ective knowledge.
6. Dreams, Beliefs and Scepticism
But is the assumption that we do believe things in our dreams accu-
rate? Sosa has denied this (cf. Sosa 2005, 2007: ch. 1). According to 
him, to dream is to imagine something and not to hallucinate or falsely 
believe it.6 Sosa makes the distinction between what happens in one’s 
dream and what happens while one dreams and applies this distinction 
to beliefs and believing. I still believe that there are no dragons even 
if I am dreaming about dragons. How could I believe in my dream that 
there are dragons when I really don’t believe that there are dragons? 
The assumption of an inconsistency seems unconvincing and forced. 
Hence, we should rather give up the idea that we do have beliefs in 
our dreams. Sosa extends this argument from dispositional beliefs to 
occurrent or manifest thoughts. We don’t think or believe things in our 
dreams, we rather imagine things.
I don’t want to go further into this imagination model of dreaming 
but rather discuss the way Sosa uses it as an anti-sceptical weapon 
(cf. Sosa 2005, 2007: ch. 1, cf. also the exchange between Cohen 2009: 
124–125 and Sosa 2009b: 142–143). Consider the claim to know that one 
is seated. Sosa argues that it is rational to go with the assumption that 
one is sitting and is not merely dreaming it. Only when one is awake can 
one ask a question (Am I sitting? Do I know that?) and answer it. When 
one is dreaming one cannot even ask a question (not to mention answer 
it). Hence, while awake the rational thing to do is to answer questions 
like “Am I sitting?” in the positive (when apparently sitting).
It is not quite clear in what sense this is rational. If the subject can-
not distinguish between being awake and dreaming, then there is no 
reason accessible to her to “assume” she is awake and having thoughts 
and beliefs, raising questions and answering them (cf. Ichikawa 2008, 
2009).
But perhaps Sosa’s idea here is rather that the subject could reﬂ ect in a 
decision-theoretic way (where the alternative acts are either to trust or not 
to trust the appearances, and where the outcomes are epistemic ones):
Circumstances
Awake Dreaming
Acts Go with appearances good indifferentDon’t bad indifferent
6 McGinn (2006: ch. 6) argues for an imagination account of dreaming but in 
contrast to Sosa he also argues that we do have beliefs (or, at least, quasi-beliefs) in 
dreams (cf. ch. 7, esp. 110, 112)
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According to Sosa, however, neither act is available in the case of 
dreams: neither can one ask or answer questions nor can one suspend 
judgment, go with or against appearances. How then should we frame 
the decision matrix?
We need a more general notion of thought, covering both the things 
we do when awake (genuine asking and answering of questions, sus-
pending judgment, etc.) and when dreaming (“pseudo-asking”, etc.). 
Let us call these kinds of thoughts “super-thoughts” (“super-asking 
questions”, “super-answering questions”, “super-suspending judg-
ment”, etc.). Now, one could have problems with such a very general 
conception of thought—isn’t it an invention of an arbitrary category of 
thought when we have no reason to assume there is a unitary phenom-
enon here? On the other hand, if one gives up this idea, then it is even 
harder to explain what “rationality” could mean in this kind of context; 
we would, at least, be at a loss when trying to construct a decision-
theoretic matrix.
Presumably, the revised version of the matrix for super-thoughts 
would, according to Sosa, be the following one:
Circumstances
Awake Dreaming
Acts Super-go with appearances good indifferentDon’t bad indifferent
Hence, the ﬁ rst act dominates the second one. In other words, while 
awake it is rational to go with appearances even if one cannot distin-
guish between being awake and dreaming.
Still, there are several problems with this strategy. First, why should 
one assume that there is only one “deviant” or sceptical circumstance? 
What about evil demons (old and new), brains in vats, Berkeleian worlds, 
etc.? It seems that we don’t even have an idea of what all the possible 
deviant circumstances might be. And, upon reﬂ ection, we can become 
aware of that. How then can it be rational then to go with the ﬁ rst act? 
Second, even if we accept the claim that the circumstances in the matrix 
above are all there are it is not clear what the outcomes are in the devi-
ant case. Perhaps pseudo-going with appearances will be really bad (be-
cause it has an impact on our epistemic virtues when awake)? But then 
no act dominates the other one anymore. We need an argument which 
shows that the ﬁ rst act is the rational one in terms of possible outcomes; 
for that we need an argument which tells us why we should expect the 
above outcomes rather than others. Third, even if from the perspective 
of the subject it is rational to super-go with the appearances, it is doubt-
ful whether this is sufﬁ cient for a successful reply to the sceptic: One can 
be justiﬁ ed in one’s false propositional attitudes, even if they are sys-
tematically false. The subject could thus be perfectly rational in super-
going with the appearances but might still be wrong. This possibility 
seems sufﬁ cient to entertain legitimate sceptical worries.
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7. Conclusion
Much more could be said about Sosa’s ideas about knowledge and scep-
ticism and about the objections raised above. But it is better to stop 
here and see what can be said in Sosa’s defence.7
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